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
A recent body of empirical cross-country research has confirmed that
income equality is positively related to economic growth. This paper
provides an explanatory channel for this observed relationship. The novelty
of its approach consists in the use of demographic channels to account for
cross-country differentials in economic growth and  income distribution.
The paper builds upon three empirical regularities that have emerged in the
recent growth literature. The first, is that when one controls for such factors
as initial level of GDP per capita and education, income inequality is
negatively related to long run growth. Second, income distribution is
affected by age structure, with a younger working age population positively
related to income inequality. Finally, age structure also plays upon the level
of economic growth independent of its role through income distribution. In
this paper we argue that these associations cannot be confirmed solely via
the use of cross-country growth regressions. In order to determine the
direction of causation one has to formalise the economic mechanisms that
account for the empirical results. In our overview of the theory we analyse
four models that have emerged as the most plausible transmission
mechanisms linking inequality to slower growth. In each instance we
demonstrate how a consideration of demographic age structure can
compliment the four mainstream accounts
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One of the more challenging goals in macroeconomics is to explain the
variation in economic growth that one observes across countries over the
same period of time. In this regard, Solow’s (1956) neo-classical growth
model and its prediction of absolute convergence has served economists well.
Absolute convergence refers to the proposition that regardless of initial
conditions, all economies approach the same steady state level of income and
growth per person. Despite its powerful intuitive appeal, the Solow model has
a problem. When it is estimated via the use of cross-country regressions, it
performs rather poorly (Mankiw, 1995).
As a result of its empirical failure economists have abandoned their
belief in absolute convergence and today most adhere to a less restrictive
proposition termed conditional convergence. Conditional convergence makes
two alternative predictions regarding income and economic performance.
First, depending on initial conditions such as individual rates of saving and
population growth, countries will reach different steady state levels of income
per person. Second, depending on any initial deviation from their own steady
state, countries will display differing rates of economic growth. These
predictions are in accordance with what is generally observed in cross-country
empirical work.
Over the past decade attempts have been made to link differences in
initial conditions with subsequent variations in economic growth. Typically
the empirical papers estimate regressions on samples of 50 to 100 countries
where the dependent variable, in most cases, is each country’s average growth
rate of income per capita. On the right-hand side, a host of independent
variables measured at the starting point of the growth period attempt to
account for observed differences in subsequent rates of economic
performance. Summarising the results of this literature has proved to be a
rather daunting task (Temple, 1999; Lloyd-Ellis 2001). For our purposes,
however, only one finding is worth noting: when factors such as the initial
level of income and human capital are held constant, countries with more
egalitarian distributions of income tend to grow faster than otherwise similar
counterparts. Empirically, this finding has been independently confirmed in
several recent studies (Aghion et al, 1999).
1
1 One dissenting voice has been Forbes (2000), who has recently criticised these cross-
country results using a new data set. A more subtle result is provided by Barro (1999) who
finds that the negative effect of inequality on growth is significant for poorer countries but
vanishes above a certain GDP per capita threshold.4
Stemming from the observation that income inequality and growth are
inversely related, the modern literature has sought to provide explanatory
channels whereby this relation can occur. Theoretically, four channels have
been advanced and they can be categorised into two broad classes of models.
The (1) agency cost and (2) credit constraint approaches are purely economic,
while the (3) fiscal policy and (4) social instability models are political
economic in nature. This paper contends that both the politico-economic and
the economic-based explanations have underlying demographic determinants
that have not been fully explored in the literature.
There is, of course, a fairly straightforward connection between age
structure and economic growth. Recent empirical evidence has demonstrated
that across countries and over time, younger relative cohort sizes tend to be
associated with higher inequality (Higgins and Willimason, 1999). A
graphical illustration may prove useful. Figure 1 plots the relation between
income inequality and the percentage of the mature working age population
(e.g., those aged 40-59) across 38 countries for the early 1980s. It shows an
inverse relationship between income inequality and mature working age
populations, with a cluster of OECD economies in the top left-hand quadrant
and lower income countries occupying the lower right hand portion of the
graph.
2 If the link between inequality and growth is to be believed, then age
structure indirectly affects growth by first influencing income distribution. In
this paper, however, we restrict our attention to the direct channels linking
age structure to economic performance. In more precise terms, our argument
is that age structure and growth are related via the same four mechanisms
that link inequality to performance in the modern growth literature.
3
2 The inverse relationship between mature populations and inequality is found in similar
scatterplots for 1960, 1970 and 1990 and in regressions where we control for country fixed
effects, education and levels of economic development.
3 Demographic age structure is a better exogenous (explanatory variable) than income
distribution since it is primarily determined by fertility rates 20 to 65 years previously.Figure 1 Age Structure and Inequality
Source: Calculations based on data from Deininger and Squire (1996) data set and United Nations World Population Prospects 1998.
Figure 2: Age Structure and Inequality
Income Inequality (Gini Ratio c.1980)








































































































This paper is organised as follows. After presenting an illustrative case study
and an overview of the relevant historical literature linking inequality to
economic performance, Section 2 sets out the basic questions explored in our
theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the intuition behind the agency
cost, credit constraint, fiscal policy and social instability models, which link
inequality to economic growth. We then, in the same section, demonstrate
how in each case considerations of age structure provide complimentary
transmission mechanisms to those in the inequality growth models. Section 4
summarises the theoretical arguments and assesses their strengths against the
empirical literature surveyed. In Section 5 we conclude our discussion.
2 LINKING INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND AGE
STRUCTURE TO GROWTH
Our overview of the literature first explores the link between inequality and
growth beginning with early theories and moving on to those that are
currently employed. Given the number of recent literature reviews (Fereira,
1999; Temple, 1999; Aghion et al., 1999 and Lloyd-Ellis, 2001), we sketch
out rather than synthesise the logic of modern studies. Our focus is on the
manner in which demographic considerations – in particular cross-national
variations in age structure -- can add explanatory power to the four modern
channels on offer. We do this with special attention paid to Canadian and
OECD cases where appropriate.
2.1 A Tale of Three Countries: Japan, Korea and the Philippines
To introduce the theme of this section we shall revisit, in a slightly amended
fashion, a case raised by both Lucas (1993) and Benabou (1996) at the
beginning of their respective papers. During the early sixties, Japan, South
Korea and the Philippines were similar with respect to many major economic
measures (e.g., GDP per capita, population size, primary and secondary
school enrolment). Japan was clearly the outlier in the group with GDP per
capita roughly triple that of Korea and double that of the Philippines. But if
anything, based on conditional convergence criteria, this should have made
Japan’s per-capita economic growth rate lower relative to the two other
economies. However, this was not the case, as Japan over the next 20 years
grew faster than the Philippines, and over the same period Korea experienced
triple the growth of the Philippines. How was this possible? The answer,
according to Benabou (1996), resides in looking beyond first moments (e.g.,
averages) and instead looking to the distribution of income.
As pointed out by Benabou and as reproduced in Table 1, South Korea
was considerably more egalitarian than the Philippines in 1960, with a Gini7
ratio that was 40 percent lower, while Japan was even more equal still with a
Gini ratio slightly lower than that of Korea’s. But there was another
difference not mentioned by either Benabou or Lucas. Much like the
distribution of income, the distribution of the population was more highly
skewed in the Philippines towards a younger age-cohort. Although not as
dramatic as the Gini ratio differences, the relative cohort size -- the ratio of
young to older adults in the population -- was larger in the Philippines than in
South Korea, with Japan possessing the most mature workforce of all three as
measured by the percentage of the population between 40 and 59 years of
age.
4










Japan 33.1 2,954 18.9 5.76
Korea 35.2 904 14.5 5.95
Philippines 48.1 1,033 13.7 1.77
Source: Calculations based on data from Penn World Tables Mark 5.6, Deininger and
Squire (1996) data set;  United Nations World Population Prospects 1998.
Naturally this particular example does not constitute proof that either greater
initial equality or larger initial mature working-age populations are associated
with faster economic growth. The example does, however, highlight that age
structure and income distributions are two potentially very important
determinants of cross-country economic performance.
2.2 The Link Between Inequality and Growth: A Historical Perspective
The analysis of the relationship between income distribution and economic
growth has undergone a number of phases. In some reviews of the economic
growth literature it is commonly assumed that Persson and Tabellini (1992)
4 The percentage of the working age population is the appropriate demographic variable when
one is looking at the impacts of income distribution on economic growth, since income
earnings peak at these ages. This is true regardless of whether one considers 40-59 year olds
as a percentage of the working age population or the total population. Note however, that this
would not be the case if one was examining the demographic impact of the affect of wealth
distribution on economic performance since much of the wealth in any population is owned
by the 60+ population.8
were the first to link initial distributions of income with subsequent levels of
economic growth. While this might be true of their empirical work, theoretically
this line of argument dates back to a much earlier period.
 5 Beginning with
Keynes (1936), the emphasis was first placed on the issue of how income
distribution could affect aggregate demand. Kaldor (1956), building upon the
work of Klein (1947) and Harrod (1939), shifted attention to the relationship
between distribution and growth, and in the process established what has come
to be known as the pro-equality argument. Though these theories are fast
approaching their 50th and in some cases 60th anniversaries, they have not been
completely forgotten. Leightner (1992), for example, in a relatively recent study,
uses a model very similar to Kaldor and finds empirical support for it.
6
Over the past decade roughly 15 studies that have sought to answer the
question of whether inequality is bad for growth. In a majority of cases (though
not all) the results confirm that inequality is indeed detrimental to growth.
Interestingly, the modern literature shares a similarity with more traditional
institutional arguments.
7 The link centres on the role that imperfections play in
the market. The imperfections pointed to by modem research take the form of
financial and credit market discontinuities rather than social barriers. The
modern approaches, though differing in their transmission mechanisms, all
emphasise that growth is the result of investment in physical or human capital.
3.  MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: CAN
AGE STRUCTURE ‘ADD VALUE’?
Four models share the lead role in accounting for the empirical regularities
regarding income distribution and economic growth described above. They are:
(1) fiscal policy channels; (2) social conflict channels; (3)  agency cost models;
and (4) capital market imperfection models with human capital spillovers. Given
5 Even from an empirical perspective, the equity-efficiency trade-off was questioned much
earlier. See Osberg (1984).
6 Leightner’s model is slightly different in that it does not treat inequality as we generally
do, namely as the distribution of income among the population. Rather he examines the
inequality of factor shares between capital and labour. The pro-equality arguments runs
something like the following: (1) labour has a higher marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of income than does capital; (2) if labour has a higher MPC, then increasing the
share of total income going to labour will induce greater consumption; (3) consumption
today increases investment; (4) if investment increases, then so does economic growth; (5)
therefore, increasing the share of total national income going to labour increases economic
growth.
7 During the seventies and eighties, macro economists lost interest in issues of distribution.
During a 1987 symposium devoted to the issue of the productivity and economic growth
slowdown, not one paper mentioned income distribution as a possible determinant.
Moreover all the participants ignored one of the major events of this century, the baby
boom. See Fischer (1988).9
that four recent studies (Fereira, 1999; Temple, 1999; Aghion et al, 1999; and
Lloyd-Ellis, 2001) have summarised the literature in this area, we provide the
intuition behind the four models rather than  fully reviewing their content. In
each case we critically assess the models both theoretically and empirically and
then point to the demographic linkages present in each.
Political Economy Channels: The Fiscal Policy Approach
Like their economic counterparts discussed later in the text, the modern
politico-economic approach assumes that growth is the result of investment in
physical or human capital. Two major political channels – the fiscal policy and
social conflict model – attempt to account for the observed relation between
inequality and growth. We begin with the former.
The fiscal policy theories have been simultaneously advanced by Persson
and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). In both cases they have
developed theoretical models that explain why highly concentrated wealth
distributions are conducive to lower rates of economic performance. Both
arguments are quite similar and follow the logic of public choice theory. Alesina
and Rodrik (1994) begin by assuming that voter preferences influence
government policies. When income inequality is quite large, vast segments of
the population are more likely to tax growth-promoting activities and press for
state transfers. Growth promoting activities are simply defined by the authors as
investments in physical and human capital. Policies that maximise growth are
optimal only for a government that cares about investors. The higher the
inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation and fiscal
redistribution, and consequently the lower the growth rate.
While intuitively appealing and certainly in line with the tenets of
mainstream economic thinking, these models suffer from a curious flaw: the
evidence runs opposite to that predicted by median voter models. Among
advanced countries, pre-tax inequality has a significantly negative effect on
every major category of social transfers as a fraction of GDP (Rodriguez, 1998;
Gomez and Meltz, 2001).  More surprisingly, the effect of transfers on growth is
actually positive in most studies (Benabou, 2000).
The channel linking higher ex-ante inequality to lower ex-post tax rates is
simple and relies on the well established phenomena that voting propensities,
along with every reported form of political activity, increase with income
(Rosenstone and Hensen, 1993; Benabou, 2000). The poor simply participate
and vote less than the rich. This may explain why economies with more10
compressed earnings distributions also tend to have higher voter turnout (IDEA,
2001).
8
Furthermore, it may be that for this reason many countries are below their
optimal tax threshold; the region where higher taxes combined with productive
public spending will lead to higher growth. The idea of an optimal tax threshold
rests on the notion  that because richer agents can more easily substitute private
alternatives for public goods and because lower income agents are more
dependent on State expenditures in services like health, education, public
transport and basic infrastructure, public expenditure can play a simultaneously
equalising and performance enhancing role (Ferreira, 1995). As a result,
inequality may indeed cause lower growth for fiscal policy reasons, but only
because inequality leads to (1) less political participation amongst the poor, (2)
lower taxes and (3) less public investment. This implies an alternative fiscal
policy mechanism than the one currently espoused by Alesina et al (1994).
Figure 3 contrasts the two political-economic channels discussed above.
8 There has been very little systematic work (theoretical or empirical) done on the
determinants of political participation and voter turnout.11






















GrowthSource: Calculations based on data from IDEA (2001); United Nations World Population Prospects 1998.
Figure 4: Voter Turnout and Age Structure
















































































































Political Economy Channels and Age Structure
There are two ways in which demographic considerations can enhance the
fiscal policy picture presented above. The first builds upon the observation
that political participation is positively related to age.
9 As shown in Table 3
below, for Canada it is the case that conditional on income, the propensity to
vote in a federal election rises as voters become older.
Given this micro-relation, one could generalise and predict that at the
macro-economic level, greater proportions of mature-aged voters in a
population will increase voter turnout and political participation. Figure 4
reveals that over the low-to-medium range, countries with more mature
populations (e.g., the proportion of the voting age population aged 40-59) do
indeed exhibit greater voter turnout. Empirically, the relationship appears
much like a logistic function with voter turnout rising with age and then
declining as it reaches an asymptote when approaching 100 percent.
 10 A more
precise estimate of this turning point is found when we regress the proportion
of those aged 40-59 and its square in 1990 against voter turnout in the 1990s
for 52 countries.
Table 2 shows that a robust and highly significant relation exists
between voter turnout and mature age populations even after controlling for
levels of economic development and education. Voter turnout amongst the
voting aged population (VAP) peaks when the proportion of voters aged 40-
59 constitutes roughly 23 per cent of the population. In this paper we do not
offer a theory as to why voter turnout appears to increase and then flatten as
countries age; all we suggest is that age structure has to be part of any fiscal
policy explanation that purports to account for the effect of inequality on
voting propensities and political pressure to redistribute income.
The second link between demography and fiscal policy rests upon the
observation that attitudes towards redistribution and demand for public
expenditures differ significantly across age groups. Table 3 shows that in
9 There is of course a simultaneity problem in that the two variables (market income and
age) march hand in hand, and so it is hard to disentangle the effects of each.
10 Several countries stand out and do not follow the pattern mentioned above. Switzerland,
in particular, has a very low voter turnout despite being one of the oldest countries in the
OECD. This apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that these are data for federal
elections and in Switzerland the federal government has much less power than in other
countries such as the UK. Other particularly notable outliers such as the U.S and Japan can
be explained by other country specific effects such as lack of automatic voter registration
in the U.S. and a post war electoral system that gives the incumbent Japanese political
party huge advantages.14
Canada the young (18-24) and the old (65+) tend to be the most supportive of
public transfers and tend to place a higher priority on public spending over
deficit reduction than otherwise comparable 25-64 year olds. The group with
least demand for redistribution or public services, and hence the most
susceptible to calls for lower taxes, is the 25-64 age group. Those aged 35-54,
raising families and presumably in need of the most after-tax disposable
income, reside at the heart of that age group. In Canada during the mid
nineties the entire baby boom generation (those born between 1947 to 1966)
moved into their thirties.
11 In 1998 this totalled 9.9 million people, or 32.4
percent of the Canadian population (Foot and Stoffman, 2000). That means
that one third of the population are boomers entering their family formation
years and for that reason alone, when that group gets interested in a particular
idea (e.g., reducing taxes or the deficit) the rest of society has to take notice.
Table 2 – Voter Turnout and Age Structure Across Countries










GDP per capita in 1990 ($000) 5,551 -1.60
(-2.58)
Mature Population in 1990 (%) 18.29 18.28
(4.58)





Note: The dependent variable is average voter turnout amongst voting age population in
the 1990s (mean=64.9). The t-statistics are  in parentheses. Mature populations defined
as proportion of the population aged 40-59. Calculations based on data from Penn
World Tables Mark 5.6; Institute for Democracy and Economic Assistance (2001);
United Nations World Population Prospects 1998.
Table 3: Probability of Political Participation and Political Orientation by Age
in Canada
11 It is important to note that Canada’s baby boom was the largest in the western world. In
fact only three other Western countries – the United States, Australia, and New Zealand –














1. Voted in Last Federal
Election
59.0 86.1 87.0 91.5 94.5 92.2
2. Gov’t Should Reduce
Inequality
53.6 43.8 44.5 41.9 40.3 47.4
3. Deficit Reduction Major
Priority
40.7 49.5 51.7 47.8 56.1 42.3
  Source: Calculations based on Lipset and Meltz (1996) Angus Reid Survey.
Proportions based on controls for income and education.
Social Conflict Channels
A second politico-economic model has been advanced by Alesina and Perotti
(1993, 1996). Here the link between inequality and growth does not depend
on fiscal policy, but rather inequality fuels political and social discontent,
which can take on varied forms from riots and coups to increased property
crime. The creation of socio-political instability, in turn, reduces investment
and ultimately hinders economic growth.
 12
Although this channel seems better suited to highly unstable and
unequal developing economies, it has also been confirmed in studies of the
effect of urban inequalities on productivity in the U.S. and in OECD
countries. In the city-based literature, Benabou (1996) has shown that
disparities in the ratio of suburban to urban incomes lowers output and wages
in the entire metropolitan region. He also shows that in metropolitan areas
with greater income inequality, average household income is lower even
amongst the most affluent.
Numerous studies in the U.S. have also shown that poverty and
inequality are powerful predictors of homicide, violent crime and other forms
of non-political unrest (Kennedy et al. 1998). Time series evidence reveals
that the hollowing out of America’s urban core during the seventies, eighties
and early nineties was partly induced by growing inner city crime and a flight
of workers and jobs to the suburbs (South and Crowder, 1997). The channel
linking such social problems, especially violence and homicide, to greater
income inequality involves the concept of social capital (e.g., trust and civic
participation), which undermined by large gaps between rich and poor. In a
study by Kawachi et al. (1997) income inequality across U.S. states was
12 Criminologists have long seen this connection as well. In the sociological literature, it is
termed ‘relative deprivation theory.’ In an early study Blau and Blau  (1982) discovered
that in the U.S., income inequality in a Standard Metropolitan Area (SMA) substantially
raised its rate of criminal violence.16
strongly correlated with violent crime (r = 0.76) as well as measures of social
capital, such as per capita group membership (r = -0.40) and lack of social
trust (r = 73).
In other contexts, there is evidence that greater inequality impairs a
national government’s ability to adopt optimal policies to cope with major
external shocks (Rodrik, 1998). Co-operation from various stakeholders is
essential for the undertaking of successful macro-economic stabilisation and
such consensus is often facilitated by a greater degree of income equality
(Bruno and Easterly, 1998). Once again we find that popular support for
redistribution decreases with inequality, at least over a certain range. In short,
progressive policies and their consequent social stability meet with a wider
consensus in a fairly homogenous society, but face stronger opposition in an
unequal one.
Social Conflict Channels and Age Structure
Widespread social discontent is responsive to labour market incentives and
this crucial insight needs to be incorporated into models of inequality,
instability and growth. In a standard time allocation model paid employment
is the alternative to protest or crime.  Therefore, private and social forms of
discontent (e.g., property crime or public protest) should respond to changes
in wages and unemployment probabilities. The propensity to engage in
property crime, for example, has decidedly demographic implications.
The likelihood of committing a violent crime -- a form of private
discontent popular in many U.S. states -- increases with age until a person
reaches their mid-twenties and then declines. Though levels of crime differ
markedly across countries, the inverse relationship between age and crime is
quite robust. So strong is this demographic relationship in fact, that most
epidemiological data linking crime to any other exogenous cause has to be
standardised for age (Kennedy et al., 1998).
The age distribution of crime could be related to deviant attitudes, as
some of the criminology literature attempts to argue, or it may be a labour
market phenomenon responding to wages and the probability of being
employed. Wages and employment rates represent the opportunity costs of
committing a crime or of protesting, and wages and employment rates rise
steeply over the lifecycle.
13
13 Note that this same logic can be applied to the opportunity cost of shirking at the firm
level, which rises with the wage (which itself is correlated positively to age). Generalising,
we can say that the opportunity cost of shirking rises with age.17
Examining the period of highest crime in the U.S. -- the twenty-five
year period from  the late 1970s to the late 1980s – reveals that it was a time
when the last leg of the baby boom passed through its late teens and early
twenties. It was also a time when wages fell substantially for young men
(Katz and Murphy, 1992). Both effects, therefore, reinforced each other as
larger younger age cohorts pushed wages down thus lowering the opportunity
cost of crime, while at the same time the tail end of the baby boom entered
into their peak crime participation years (Grogger, 1998).
The effects of these patterns of deviance on economic performance
have not been estimated with any degree of accuracy. However, persuasive
examples abound. In Japan there was violent labour unrest in the late fifties
and early sixties (Kenney and Florida, 1988), a time when nearly 36 percent
of the Japanese population was aged 15-34.  In the U.S., the abandonment of
inner cities that occurred during the eighties and early nineties was strongly
attributed to rising crime rates (South and Crowder, 1997), but it also
coincided with the period in which 15-34 year olds comprised 35 and 32
percent of the population respectively. During the relatively tranquil 1950s,
the percentage of 15-34 year olds was only 25 percent.  Attaching an
economic value to the social disruption brought about by youth crime and
unrest is difficult. The L.A. riots and the social unrest and property crime that
struck most major American in the early nineties had an appreciable
economic cost. 
14 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) estimated the costs of one
day of rioting to be 440 million dollars in L.A. alone.
Agency Cost Models
The intuition behind agency cost models and their link to growth theory is
derived from the economics of information and appears in several works by
Joseph Stiglitz (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986).
Inequalities in income and wealth generally require principals (owners of
assets) to delegate the use of their assets to subordinates (agents). Since most
transactions are undertaken with imperfect and incomplete information, it is
very costly to specify a perfect contract in which all the actions of the agent
are accounted for in each contingency. Even if such a contract were specified,
it would be very difficult to monitor and enforce. This is the heart of the
principal-agent problem that creates agency costs. Agency costs and the steps
taken to mitigate them (like closer monitoring) affect output in a number of
14 Of course it also led to several responses on the part of authorities; major federal public
outlays for crime control and substantial investments in inner city redevelopment that have
produced what some have called an ‘urban renaissance’ in the U.S.18
ways.
15 More precisely, if inequality positively affects agency costs then it
will also be the case that economic performance will be impaired.
The elements of the above channel that lead from higher inequality to
lower growth are difficult to test for several reasons. First, the model implies
that asset inequality is the cause of higher agency costs, and so in the absence
of asset data, one has to use income inequality as a proxy. Second, one would
have to establish the agency cost link first and then look at the reduced form
linking inequality and growth as an indirect confirmation of its effect on
performance. Finally, there may be a number of steps taken to reduce agency
costs (e.g., hiring of private security) that are not efficient, but that add to
estimates of GDP and hence appear beneficial to estimates of economic
growth.
Despite these problems there is evidence that agency costs do impair
economic performance.
16 Within, as well as across, an advanced economy
there is evidence that low wages and higher monitoring are systematically
related (Gordon, D., 1996).
17 The micro-foundation for this relationship stems
from the fact that when principals pay a lower wage they decrease the cost of
shirking. Consequently, in the presence of imperfect information effort has to
be sustained by monitoring agents more closely.
Agency Cost Models and Age Structure
How can considerations of age structure enhance the agency cost channel?
Firstly, there is evidence that monitoring costs are higher in establishments
employing younger workers. This is related to the opportunity cost of shirking
which is lower for young workers, both because they earn a lower wage and
because they possess less firm specific capital. Figure 5 uses micro-data from
the Canadian General Social Survey on Work and Retirement (Cycle 9) and
15 For details see Furman and Stigltz (1998).
16 Within lower income economics that are dominated by agricultural activity, output per
acre is 16 percent higher on owner-occupied land than on sharecropped land.
Sharecropping contracts are widespread and ‘solve’ the problem of costly monitoring by
ensuring the tenant has an incentive to work. However, by imposing in effect a marginal
tax rate (of between 30-90 percent in some cases) these contracts lead to an under-supply
of effort and under investment in the land.  If there was a more equitable distribution of
assets (land and wealth) the result could be an improvement in agricultural productivity
(Furman and Stigltz, 1998).
17 Using an economy wide index of supervisory intensity, Gordon (1994) found that the
ratio of administrative and managerial workers over the sum of clerical, service and
production workers in his sample of 12 economies was negatively related to average wage
levels: in other words remuneration and supervisory intensity are traded off. For more on
the Canadian pattern between supervisory burdens and wages see Gomez (2001).19
shows a discernible negative relationship between the probability of being
highly supervised at work and age of worker.
18 For example, a worker aged
15-19 is 50 percent more likely to be supervised closely than a comparable 50
year old. Evidence in the U.S. also shows that larger younger working age
cohorts put downward pressure on wage levels (Macunovich, 1998). This
observation combined with the contention that low wage growth among
bottom earners leads firms to misallocate labour in the form of overstaffing in
low skill occupations (Gordon, R., 1996), produces an age-based channel for
increased agency costs that also includes wage dispersion.
The argument is simple, in a country with plenty of young workers
relative to older ones, unskilled and semiskilled labour is in abundant supply.
Firms faced with such a relaxed labour constraint have a lower incentive to
substitute youth labour (which is cheap) with new technology (which is
expensive). Such a production technology lowers labour productivity, widens
wage dispersion and increases agency costs, as cheap labour has to be
monitored more closely. This demographic effect appears in its reduced form
when we regress inequality and economic growth and find that the two are
inversely related.
18 The inverse relationship between monitoring and age of worker remains after controlling
for wage levels and a host of demographic and firm level controls (Gomez and Wald,
2001).20







15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59         60+
Age
Source: Calculations based on Canadian General Social Survey, Cycle 9: Work and
Retirement.
Capital Market Imperfections and Human Capital Spillovers
Perhaps the most direct channel linking distribution to performance is the one
that begins with the tautological observation that the poor have fewer
resources than the rich, and thus may never fully exploit their productive
potential. Stated more formally, productive opportunities vary along a wealth
distribution which inhibits all agents from investing in their most productive
activities, despite having similar underlying capacities and effort functions.
Education would presumably be the easiest solution out of the poverty trap.
Though it varies across countries, it is well known that the return to higher
education is decidedly positive.
19 Nevertheless, poor agents may be credit
constrained and therefore not able to meet the minimum fixed cost (e.g., the
tuition fee or the opportunity cost in forgone wages) needed to undertake such
an investment, primarily because human capital cannot act as collateral.
The likelihood of credit constraints harming efficiency would be
reduced if capital markets were perfect. But capital markets, even in advanced
19 The premium to an additional year of schooling  is only 3 percent in Sweden versus 15
percent in the U.S.21
economies, are far from perfect. Just as lending is pro-cyclical (e.g., rather
than offering a life line during downturns, debts are called back during bad
times) it is also pro-collateral in that the more money you inherit the more
you can borrow.  Second, even with no borrowing constraints, the absence of
insurance markets through which individuals can divest themselves of risk
reduces an individual’s willingness to invest in education through loans even
when they are available. Therefore, if financial markets are imperfect and
borrowing is difficult or impossible, then those who inherit a large initial
endowment of wealth and do not need to borrow are better able to invest in
human capital. If the number of these people is relatively small, then an
unequal distribution of wealth and income will adversely affect the aggregate
amount of investment in human capital. Consequently, long run growth will
be lower.
The intuition above is borrowed from a model by Galor and Zeira
(1993) and rests upon a slightly problematic assumption that social mobility is
non-existent, or "that rich families remain rich and poor families remain
poor". While Galor and Zeira leave this question unanswered, other
researchers working within the financial imperfection paradigm, most notably
Durlauf (1994) and Benabou (1994), have shown how inequality can persist
across generations and how this same inequality affects subsequent economic
growth. Benabou (1996), for example, uses a rather simple model to
demonstrate how small differences in education, preferences, or initial
endowments of wealth, when combined with imperfect borrowing markets,
lead to a high degree of stratification. Stratification makes inequality in
education and income more persistent across generations, and this social
polarisation leads to the formation of ghettos and large pockets of poverty.
These areas can be very inefficient, both from the Pareto criteria and for
growth in long run aggregate output.  Benabou (1994) suggests a simple way
of capturing the interdependence between rich and poor agents, by expressing
individual output or marginal product, y(h), as a function of
(1)  y(h) = G (h, H),
where H is an economy-wide index of human capital and G is an aggregator
of some kind.
The implication of (1) is rather simple. Living in areas or working in
firms with more egalitarian distributions of income raises general levels of
human capital. If the aggregator is such and if H  is negatively related to
income inequality, then individual marginal products may differ even if
personal human capital levels remain the same. Put simply, two people of
equal ability are not equally as productive depending on the environment in22
which they work and/or live.
20 From an applied perspective one can see how
complementarities in the labour market - for example the combination of
well-educated mangers coupled with workers with low levels of training -
may not be very efficient and can lead to conflict at work. In a dynamic
setting, imperfect capital markets prevent successive generations from
improving their human capital requirements. Ultimately this also prevents
workers from acquiring the necessary skills and can lead to the formation of
ghettos and poverty traps.
Capital Market Imperfections and Age Structure
The link between age structure and capital market imperfections rests upon a
well known empirical regularity. Borrowing constraints are more binding the
younger one is (Japelli, 1990). Figure 6 shows the probability of being
liquidity constrained as a function of age.  In the U.S., it is roughly 25 percent
until the consumer is 30 years old and then the probability of being liquidity
constrained declines during middle age and approaches zero in later years. If
we use this stylised fact, we begin to see how some economies have managed
to combine lucky demographics with sound polices, in that their economic
take-off coincided with a period in which one of their initial conditions was a
high saver to borrower ratio.
Whilst it is true that saving rates are high amongst all groups in most
East Asian economies, they are still higher for older than for younger groups.
Japan, for example, had a relatively large mature working age population
from the late 1970s onward, which meant that the young and more
impoverished in Japan faced lower borrowing constraints during this period
than those living in countries that experienced large baby booms after World
War II (e.g., Canada, United States and Australia). These countries faced the
opposite problem in the late seventies and early eighties, in that they had a
small number of savers relative to borrowers exacerbating the stringency of
loan provision and pushing up interest rates (Foot and Stoffman, 2000).
Figure 7 shows the relationship between nominal interest rates and age
structure across these four economies. We see how a greater percentage of
consumers in their peak liquidity-constrained years (15-34) are positively
related to the preferred bank-lending rate. Japan experienced its relative credit
20 Evidence of these positive social interaction effects abounds. One of the most interesting
studies (from a Canadian perspective) by Idson and Kahane (2000), examines the effects
on individual hockey players of playing on teams with low variance in average talent
versus ones with higher variance. The results confirm that ‘team mates’ matter no matter
how able individuals are.  Wayne Gretzky may have been the best hockey player in the
world, but he was better when he played with Mark Messier and Paul Coffey in Edmonton
than when he played with Chris Kontos and Dale Degray in Los Angeles.23
crunch in 1960 whereas in Canada, Australia and the U.S. the ratio of
borrowers to lenders was greatest in the early eighties and early nineties,
corresponding to the years when prime lending rates were highest and when
domestic output fell.
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Source: Calculations based on Jappelli (1990: 229).
The fact that interest rates tend to be higher when there is a greater percentage
of the population in their peak liquidity constrained years (15-34) has serious
implications for central bank policies
21 and the equity-efficiency debate in
Canada, especially as it relates to tuition for higher education, which is slowly
mirroring privatised systems south of the border. As is evidenced in the U.S.,
even the provision of loans will not compensate for the risk that is associated
with investing in education as a way out of poverty, and so participation rates
into post-secondary education can be expected to fall in line with those south
of the border.  This will, holding other things constant, increase the wage
premium associated with additional years of schooling and thus exacerbate
the inequality of income.
21 Interestingly, if one compares interest rate polices in Canada and the U.S. in the early
nineties one finds that despite facing near identical demographic pressures, Canada’s
interest rate was on average 4.5 percentage points higher from 1988 to 1992. This also
coincided with the John Crow era in Canada and the early Greenspan era in the U.S. A
tentative conclusion is that Canada could have managed with lower interest rates, as in the
U.S. For more on this debate see Fortin (1999, 2000).24
Figure 7: Interest Rates and Age Structure: U.S., Canada, Australia and Japan
Sources: Calculations based on World Population Prospects 1998, United Nations; and
nominal interest rate data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database.
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Human Capital Spillovers and Age Structure
Our second demographic observation has implications for personnel functions
within firms. It was argued earlier that within firms inequality can have
negative consequences for productivity because it leads to a combination of
social and productive friction at the workplace. A large ratio of younger to
older workers within a firm can produce similar effcects, although the
channels are more speculative and will only be modelled in a very stylized
fashion here.
In the absence of tenure and in the presence of performance based
payment and promotion systems, firms will increasingly be faced with the
problem of ensuring that competition among employees does not inhibit co-
operation and the sharing of productive knowledge. Already, we know that
workers differ in their preference for performance based systems of
promotion. In Figure 8 the probability P of favouring meritocracy over
seniority is displayed for different age categories of workers in Canada. Not
surprisingly it shows that P declines as workers get older.
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Age of Worker
Source: Calculations based on Lipset and Meltz (1996) Angus Reid Survey. Probability
estimates based on controls for income and education.
Since the key to most firm-level performance is striking the proper balance
between co-operation and competition, having employees share ideas about
how to work more efficiently is good. However, having them share ideas on
how to collude so as to restrict output is bad. Similarly, having employees26
compete for promotions on the basis of who is the best works well in settings
where hierarchical structures still prevail, whereas having workers drag down
the productivity of others in order to win promotional tournaments in
environments where co-operation is essential, is not so beneficial. With these
examples in mind, age dispersion within an organisation can not only
bifurcate the earnings distribution but it can have negative consequences for
co-operation in the presence of strong performance incentives. This is so if
older workers are either uninsured against job loss -- arising perhaps from the
passing on of valuable information to younger colleagues -- or if there is no
stringent screening and monitoring mechanism in place to weed out ‘hawkish’
personality types from the more ‘dovish’.
22
4. Age Structure and Models of Inequality and Growth: A Summary
What can we conclude from our summary of the inequality-growth relation
and its connection to demographic age structure? Our paper began by noting
that inequality has a straightforward, though indirect, connection to economic
growth via its role in influencing income distribution. Specifically, inequality
tends to be lower on average, in mature populations, defined here as countries
whose proportion of people aged 40-59 is relatively high. We then focused on
the more interesting connection between age structure and the four existing
transmission mechanisms linking inequality to growth. In each case we found
that a demographic channel linked age structure to growth. These relations are
summarised in Figure 9, and in more detail in the four points below:
1.  The opportunity cost of time has implications for theories of social unrest
and agency cost models linking higher inequality to lower growth.
Expected wages and the probability of being unemployed decline over a
person’s lifecycle, thus lowering the opportunity cost of work alternatives.
Two work alternatives, the propensity to shirk, or commit crime and cause
social unrest (see Figure 5) have notable demographic determinants that
decline as individuals get older. These behaviours increase monitoring
costs and negatively affect growth and investment, but though their
attribution in the literature to income inequality we feel is correct, we also
argue that these channels should be expanded to include demographic
antecedents and interaction effects as well.
2.  The opportunity cost approach does have its limitations for it fails to
predict the lack of political participation amongst the poor and young and
the consequent low taxation and high inequality equilibrium that is
observed across countries (and which is captured in our amended fiscal
22 The intuition here is more rigorously formalised in Lazear (1998)27
policy model, see Figure 3). From a dynamic setting, one can understand
why the poor and the young may be less willing to tax high income or
mature segments of the population in order to finance their public-good
requirements. The expectation among the poor and young that they will
move out of low incomes and into higher marginal tax categories may
inhibit their expected opposition to right-wing dynasties (Benabou, 1998).
On balance, though, the data (see Table 3) seems to suggest that lack of
political participation, rather than a lower desire for redistribution, is the
cause of the median voter model’s failure to account for relatively less
redistribution in unequal societies.
3.  Credit constraint models demonstrate how initial disparities in income and
wealth are perpetuated over time, thus inhibiting the productive potential
of a society to be realised. What is missing from these models is a channel
demonstrating why these inequalities form in the first place. One could
argue that initial endowments in talent and skill are one cause. A more
plausible channel from our perspective is the timing of secular growth
cycles and the set of age related initial conditions present at time to. A
relatively large mature working age population lowers inequality, creates a
higher saver to borrower ratio that lowers interest rates (see Figures 6 and
7) and thus decreases credit constraints. This allows those equally able, but
poorer or younger, to borrow and invest in the most productive activities a
society has to offer (e.g., education, training, and entrepreneurship).
4.  Finally we demostrated how individual worker and firm performance
could be harmed by inequality, in that heterogeneity (e.g., workers of low
skill working alongside those with high skill) can lower individual
productivity. This is because workers of equal ability and skill are not as
productive in different environments. Environments characterised by wide
income disparities fare relatively poorly as compared to more egalitarian
settings because of the social disruptions that occur when inequality is
high. This notion was extended to include bifurcated age distributions
within firms. Given certain assumptions, it can be shown that frictions
between young and mature workers arise under performance-based
systems of rewards. These systems exacerbate wage dispersion among
workers employed in the same firm or performing similar tasks, thus
leading to rent seeking activities and engendering responses ranging from
the benign (information hoarding) to the pathological (co-worker
sabotage).28
Figure 9: Age Structure and Channels Linking Inequality to Lower Growth
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper was concerned with explaining the inverse relation between
income inequality and economic growth. The approach used was
straightforward. We began by describing the logic of four models that modern
literature has proposed as being the most likely transmission mechanisms
linking inequality to slower growth. We then showed how a demographic
explanation complemented each of the four mainstream accounts. In this
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paper we assumed that age structure had an obvious, though indirect, effect on
economic growth through its impact on income distribution. But independent
of its effect on income distribution, our review of theory suggests that age
structure has direct effects on economic performance. By lowering credit
constraints and generating larger stocks of human capital, or by increasing
agency costs, economic performance can be significantly affected by
variations in demographic age structure.  Stylised evidence and illustrations
demonstrated how national age structures heavily weighted with younger
working age cohorts could induce effects as diverse as lower political
participation, greater social unrest and higher interest rates.
These conclusions have both positive and normative implications. From
a positive perspective, they help explain the divergent growth paths of many
countries with otherwise similar initial economic and social conditions. From
a normative point of view, rather than objecting to income inequality solely
on the basis of equity criteria, this research suggests that considerable
efficiency losses can be incurred if a country allows for large disparities of
income to persist. The findings also suggest that appropriate government
intervention can simultaneously achieve more equality and faster economic
growth, but only up to a point conditioned on the age structure of the
population. As our theoretical discussion pointed out, a number of alternative
models can generate a similar negative relation between growth and income
inequality. In this paper, we found that income inequality increases when the
composition of the workforce grows younger. Thus, appropriate government
policies should attempt to counteract these tendencies perhaps through
minimum wage legislation or training and apprenticeship programs for
younger workers.
Rafael Gomez, London School of Economics (r.gomez@lse.ac.uk)
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REFERENCES
Aghion, P., E. Caroli and C. Garćia-Peňalosa. 1999. “Inequality and
Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories," Journal of
Economic Literature, 37, pp. 1615-1660.
Alesina, A.. and R. Perotti. 1993. “Income Distribution, Political Instability,
and Investment”. NBER  Working Paper 4486. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti. 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability,
and Investment,”   European Economic Review, 40(6), pp. 1203-28.
Alesina, A.. and D. Rodrik. 1992. “Distribution, Political Conflict, and
Economic Growth” in A. Cukierman (ed.) Political Economy, Growth, and
Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 23-49.
____________________ 1994. “Distribution Politics and Economic Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, p.456-490.
Barber, C. L. 1978. “On the Origins of the Great Depression,” Southern
Economic Journal, 44, pp. 432-456.
Barlow, R. 1994. “Population Growth and Economic Growth: Some more
Correlation’s,” Population and Development Review, 20(3), pp. 503-529.
Barro, R. 1991. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 407-443.
_______ 1999. “Inequality, Growth and Investment,” NBER Working Paper
7038. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Benabou, R. 1994. “Human Capital, Inequality and Growth: A Local
Perspective,” European Economic Review, 38(4), pp. 817-826.
_________  1996. "Unequal Societies," NBER Working Paper 5583.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
_________  1998. "Social Mobility and The demand for Redistribution: The
POUM Hypothesis" NBER Working Paper 6795. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
_________ 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social
Contract," American Economic Review, 90(1), pp. 96-129.
Blau, J. and P. Blau. 1982. “ The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure
and Violent Crime”. American Sociological Review. 47 (February): pp.114-
129.
Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrisson. 1990. “Income Distribution, Development
and Foreign Trade,” European Economic Review, 34(6), pp. 1113-1133.31
Bruno, M. and W. Easterly. 1998. “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 41(1) pp.3-26.
Chang, R. 1994. “Income Inequality and Economic Growth,” Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, July/August, pp. 1-10.
Deininger, K and L. Squire. 1996. “A New Data Set Measuring Income
Inequality.” World bank Economic Review, 10(3), pp.565-91.
Durlauf, S. 1994. “Spillovers, Stratification and Inequality,” European
Economic Review, 38(4), pp. 817-826.
Easterlin, R. 1987. Birth and Fortune. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_________   1968.  Population, Labour Force, and Long Swings in Economic
Growth. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fair, R. C. and K. M. Dominguez. 1991. “Effects of Changing U.S. Age
distribution on Macroeconomic Equations,” American Economic Review, 81
(5), pp. 1276-1294.
Ferreira, F. 1995. “Roads to Equality: Wealth Distribution Dynamics with
Public-Private Capital Complementarity” LSE-STICERD Discussion Paper
TE/95/286.
Ferreira, F. 1995. “Roads to Equality: Wealth Distribution Dynamics with
Public-Private Capital Complementarity” LSE-STICERD Discussion Paper
TE/95/286.
_________. 1999. “Inequality and Economic Performance: A Brief Overview
To Theories of Growth and Distribution.”
www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/index.htm
Fischer, S. 1988. “Symposium on the Slowdown in Productivity Growth,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives,” 2 (4), pp.3-7.
Foot, D. K. and D. Stoffman. 2000. Boom, Bust and Echo: 2000. Toronto:
Stoddart Publishing.
Forbes, K. J. 2000. “A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality
and Growth,” American Economic Review, 90(4), pp. 869-887.
Fortin, P. 1999. “The great Canadian Slump, a Rejoinder to Freedmnan and
Macklem,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 32 (4), 1082-92.
_________ 2000. “Macroeconomic Unemployment and Structural
Unemployment,” Canadian Public Policy, 26(1), pp.S126-S130.
Friedman, M. (1979). Free To Choose. New York: Touchstone Books.
Furman, J.  and J. E. Stiglitz. 1998 “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights
from East Asia,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (2), pp. 1-114.32
Galor, O. and J. Zeira. 1993. “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, pp. 35-52.
Gomez, R. and S. Wald. 2001. “Is There an Inverse Relationship Between
Supervision and Wages? Evidence from the Canadian General Social
Survey.” University of Toronto, Working Paper.
Gomez, R. and N. Meltz. 2001. "The Zero Sum Illusion: Industrial relations
and Modern Economic Approaches to Growth and Income Distribution",
Paper presented in the IRPP-CSLS Conference in January 2001, Ottawa,
Ontario
Gordon, D. 1996. Fat and Mean: The Corporate Squeeze of Working
Americans and the Myth of Managerial Downsizing. New York: Free Press.
Gordon, R. 1996. “Problems in the Measurement and Performance of Service
Sector Productivity in the U.S.” NBER Working Paper, no.5519.
Greenwald, B. C. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. “Imperfect Information, Credit
Markets and Unemployment,” NBER Working Paper 2093. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Greenwald, B. C. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1986. “Externalities in Economies with
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 101(2), pp. 229-64.
Grogger, J. 1998 “Market Wages and Youth Crime,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 16(4), pp. 756-791.
Gupta, G. 1984. “Income Distribution,” Southern Economic Journal, 51, pp.
459-468.
Harrod, R. 1939. “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, 49, pp.
14-33
Higgins, Matthew and J.G. Williamson. 1999. Explaining Inequality the World
Round. Mimeo. Harvard University.
Institute for Democracy and Economic Assistance (IDEA). 2001.
www.idea.int.
Idson, T. L. and L. H. Kahane. 2000. “Team Effects on Compensation: An
Application to Salary Determination in the National Hockey League,”
Economic Inquiry, 38(2), pp. 345-57.
Jappelli, T. 1990. “Who is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), pp.219-234.
Kaldor, N. 1956. “Alternative Theories of Distribution,” Review of Economic
Studies, 23(2), pp.94-100.33
Katz, L. F., K. M. Murphy. 1992. “ Changes  in  Relative  Wages,  1963-
1987: Supply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1),
pp. 35-78.
Kawachi, I, BP Kennedy, K. Lochner, and S.D. Prothrow. 1997. “Social
capital, Income Inequality and Mortality.” American Journal of Public
Health, 87, pp.1491-8.
Kenney, M and R. Florida. 1988. “Beyond Mass Production: Production and
the Labour Process in Japan,” Politics and Society, 16(1), pp.121-158.
Kennedy, B., I. Kawachi, S.D.Prothrow, K. Lochner, and V. Gupta. 1998.
“Social Capital, Income Inequality, and Firearm Violent Crime,” Social
Science and Medicine, 47(1), pp.7-17.
Keynes, J. M. 1937. “Economic Consequences of Declining Population
Growth,” Eugenics Review, 29, April, 13-17.
Keynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Klein, L. 1947. “Theories of Effective Demand and Employment,” Journal of
Political Economy, pp. 138-177.
Kuznets, S. 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American
Economic Review, 34(1), March, pp. 1-28.
Lazear, E. P. 1998. Personnel Economics for Managers. New York: Wiley.
Leightner, J. 1992. “The Compatibility of Growth and Increased Inequality,”
The Journal of Development Studies, 29, pp. 49-71.
Lloyd-Ellis, H. .2001. "On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in
the Short and Long Run: A Synthesis", Paper presented in the IRPP-CSLS
Conference in January 2001, Ottawa, Ontario
Lucas, R. 1993. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22, pp.3-42.
Macunovich, D. J. 1998. “Relative Cohort Size and Inequality in the United
States,”  American Economic Review, 88(2), pp. 259-264.
Mankiw, G. 1995. “The Growth of Nations,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1, pp. 275-323.
Myrdal, G. 1968. Asian Drama. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
Malberg, B. 1994. “Age Structure Effects of Economic Growth,”
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 42(3), pp. 279-295.
Osberg, L. 1984. Economic Inequality in the U.S. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Perotti, R. 1994. “Income Distribution and Investment,” European Economic
Review, 38, pp. 827-835.34
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1992. “Growth, Distribution, and Politics” in A.
Cukierman (ed.) Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles.
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, pp. 3-22.
_____________________    1994. “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?”
American Economic Review, 84, pp.600-622.
Rodriguez, F. 1998. “Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking.” Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University.
Rodrik, D. 1998. “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social
Conflict, and Growth Collapses”, NBER Working Paper 6350. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 1-27.
Rosenston, S. and J. Hansen. 1993. Mobilisation, Participation and
Democracy in America. Nw York: MacMillan, 1993.
Solow, R. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, pp. 65-94.
South, S. J. and K. D. Crowder (1997) “Residential mobility between Cities
and Suburbs: Race, Suburbanization, and Back-to the-City Moves,”
Demography, pp. 525-538.
Stack, S. 1984. “Income Inequality and Property Crime,” Criminology, 22 (2),
May, P.229-257.
Temple, J. 1999. "The New Growth Evidence," Journal of Economic
Literature, 37, pp. 112-156.
Tilak, G. 1991. “Comparative Development Indicators” in T. Psacharopoulos
(ed.) Essays on Poverty, Equity and Growth. World Bank: Pergamon Press,
pp. 360-379.
Weiss, A. 1995. “Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanation of Wages,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), pp. 133-154.